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Abstract  
This paper examines the youth guarantee programme introduced in Finland 2005. 
The reform consisted of early intervention, monitoring and individualized job 
search plans that guarantee activation measures for unemployed young persons. 
Using the age threshold set at 25 years, we find that the youth guarantee 
moderately increased unsubsidized employment while having a negligible impact 
on unemployment in the age range of 23-24. We also show that the positive 
impacts of the youth guarantee only materialize among unemployed young 
persons with a vocational education. There are no signs that the guarantee 
improved the labour market prospects of young uneducated people. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Currently, the number of unemployed young people in the EU exceeds the population of Denmark. 
Youth unemployment brings about massive economic costs in terms of lost production and social 
benefit payments. The social costs that may materialize in the future are even more alarming. There is 
a real possibility that unemployment at younger ages causes future unemployment, and increases 
social exclusion. Against this background, the European Commission launched the European Youth 
Guarantee Initiative in 2013 to ensure an active opportunity for young people within four months 
after leaving education or becoming unemployed. The intention was to create opportunities by 
offering quality job offers, active labour market measures, better public employment services and 
apprenticeship schemes (EU Commission, 2013). Member states were requested to draw up a Youth 
Guarantee Implementation Plan by spring 2014. The stakes are high, since a total of 6 billion euros of 
additional EU financing are to be dedicated to the youth unemployment problem in 2014-2015, let 
alone the estimated total cost of 21 billion in national budgets prioritized for this youth initiative (ILO 
2012).  
The initiative sounds appealing but the question remains to what extent youth guarantees really 
deliver something new to tackle youth unemployment.  Existing empirical evidence from Nordic 
countries that have implemented guarantees for decades indicates mixed results. Carling and Larsson 
(2005) examined the 1998 Swedish municipal youth guarantee targeted at unemployed persons 
below the age of 25. Hall and Liljeberg (2011) analysed the 2007 Swedish youth job guarantee reform 
implemented by the public employment services. Both studies report a positive employment effect 
prior to the activation period. Carling and Larsson found no overall improvement, mainly because of 
the locking-in effect during participation in the programme, while Hall and Liljeberg report a positive 
employment effect after the activation period. Hardoy et al. (2006) report somewhat more positive 
employment effects for Norway. Their results show an increase in the transition rate from 
unemployment to employment of a magnitude of 4-11%. 
This study contributes to the scarce evidence on the overall impacts of youth guarantees by 
analysing the youth guarantee (YG) reform introduced in Finland in 2005. This reform is particularly 
interesting as the European Commission recently identified the Finnish youth guarantee as being best 
practice for other member states. Even though the Commission referred to the current version of the 
Finnish YG, the principal elements of it were already introduced in the 2005 reform. The key elements 
include the target group being all inactive young persons under the age of 25, early intervention with a 
pre-scheduled procedure, stricter monitoring, job search plans in the early stages of unemployment 
and guaranteed activation. In particular, a draft job search plan had to be drawn up within one month 
after registering as an unemployed job seeker. The actual signing of an individualized job search plan 
was brought forward to three months from the previous five months. An entirely new element was 
that the plan had to include an offer of a job, education, training, or some other active measure. This 
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offer had to be provided within three months of signing the plan. Since no such guarantee was 
introduced nor any time limits changed among older age cohorts, we are able to use this age limit in 
identifying the impact of the youth guarantee.  
The effects of the YG reform are analysed within a difference-in-differences (DiD) framework. We 
begin the analysis by focusing on unemployment duration and subsequent transitions. We then 
expand our analysis to cover the whole target population - for two reasons. First, some of the affected 
young people may choose not to register as an unemployed job seeker in order to avoid early 
intervention and stricter monitoring, see Dahlberg et al. (2008). If they are mainly disadvantaged 
young people, the DiD results of survival analysis will be biased upwards. Second, the YG has a strong 
emphasis on preventing social exclusion. Without taking a stance on how to define or measure social 
exclusion, it is probable that unemployment spells are only partially correlated with it. To get some 
insight into the effects on both unemployment entry and marginalization, we explore several outcome 
variables. These include unemployment incidence, application for and enrolment in education, income, 
use of social assistance and mental health.  
Our results show no compositional change in unemployment entry, a small 2 percentage point 
increase in the activation ratio and a positive employment effect of a magnitude of 5 days. Our primary 
finding is that the youth guarantee reform mainly affected skilled unemployed young persons who 
already had a vocational secondary education. We find no effects among the most disadvantaged group 
of unemployed young people, i.e. those unskilled young persons with only compulsory schooling. The 
most likely explanation for this arises from the fact that early activation was already used among 
uneducated youngsters before the introduction of the YG. To fulfil the performance goals set, local 
employment services seem to have focused on skilled unemployed young persons.  
 
2. THE YOUTH GUARANTEE  
Finland has a long history of high youth unemployment. A severe banking crisis, together with the 
collapse of Soviet trade in the early 1990s, raised the overall unemployment rate from around 3% to 
nearly 17% in just three years. Figure 1 shows that the deep recession was especially harsh among 
young people, whose unemployment rate peaked at nearly 35%. The recession was followed by a long 
period of economic growth, which narrowed the gap between Finland and the EU15 in adult 
unemployment rates by the millennium. The youth unemployment rate, however, remained at a much 
higher level than the EU15 (and EU28) average until the 2009 financial crisis.  
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In January – August 2006, 70% of 30,700 youths passing the three-month time limit had a signed plan, 
and towards the end of 2007 the share had risen to 77%.  
 
3. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Carling and Larsson (2005) analysed the 1998 Swedish municipal youth guarantee, which was 
targeted at unemployed persons below the age of 25. They found a small positive employment effect 
just prior to the activation period, but the negative locking-in effect during programme participation 
resulted in a negligible overall impact on unemployment duration. Hall and Liljeberg (2011) analysed 
the 2007 Swedish youth job guarantee reform that had the same target group (unemployed 18-24-
year-olds) but this time the programme was implemented by the local PES. They report a positive 
employment effect for 2008 after an unemployment spell exceeded the activation threshold of 90 days. 
They also found a positive effect in 2009, but it showed up prior to the activation period with no 
impact after the start of activation. The long-term effects were found to be negligible. Norway 
temporarily extended its youth guarantee from those under the age of 20 to cover 20-24-year-olds 
during the period 1995-1998. Hardoy et al. (2006) conclude that this extension increased the 
transition rate to employment by 4% for the short-term unemployed and by almost 11% for the long-
term unemployed. The corresponding figures for transitions to active measures were 12% and 35%, 
respectively. They also explored the impact of the youth guarantee on regular education, for which 
they find no effects.   
One youth programme which closely resembles the Nordic guarantees is the New Deal for Young 
People in the UK that was targeted at 18 to 24-year-old unemployed persons. This particular scheme 
has been found to have positive effects both in the short and in the long run. Blundell et al. (2004) 
report that the six-month gateway period that comprised frequent meetings with a mentor increased 
the employment rate by 5 percentage points. De Giorgi (2005) focused on the longer-term effects of 
the New Deal. He found that the combined effects of job search assistance, training, wage subsidies and 
job experience improved the probability of employment by almost 5 percentage points.  
Even though there is scarce direct evidence of the effect of youth guarantees, some of the key 
elements embedded in these programmes have been studied in detail. First of all, intensified 
counselling and increased monitoring have been found to have positive employment effects in e.g. 
Dolton and O’Neill (1996), van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) and Micklewright and Nagy 
(2010). Any non-compliance before or during the activation period is bound to result in sanctions that 
are shown to enhance exits from welfare in Abbring et al. (2005), van der Klaauw and van Ours (2013) 
and van den Berg et. al. (2014). The effects of mandatory activation have been analysed in Black et al. 
(2003), Graversen and van Ours (2008), and van den Berg et al. (2009). These results emphasize that 
the mere threat of activation increases employment rates through the perceived leisure cost of 
unemployment. Rosholm and Svarer (2008) point out several reasons why some unemployed job 
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seekers do not want to enter activation measures. They may expect the payoff of the programme to be 
small, they may fear a stigmatizing effect or they may simply see a reduction in leisure time as being 
undesirable. Finally, the vast literature on the actual treatment effects of active measures has been 
summarized in two recent meta-analyses by Kluve (2010) and Card et al. (2010). These analyses show 
heterogeneous effects, varying from positive employment effects of employment subsidies in the 
private sector to zero effects from public sector placements. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
4.1. Identification 
Our empirical approach is based on the age limit of the youth guarantee, which targeted extensive 
activation to young people under the age of 25. The age limit creates a quasi-experimental difference-
in-difference design where the target group consists of young persons under the age of 25 while 
slightly older persons serve as the control group. This setting allows us to estimate the causal effect of 
the YG reform with two assumptions, viz. individuals do not self-select into the treatment and control 
groups, and these groups share common outcome trends in the absence of reform. The first 
assumption holds as the selection is based on a predetermined age. The second assumption is trickier 
as individuals of different ages have different opportunities to respond to economic shocks. In what 
follows, we test the hypothesis of common trends by carrying out placebo tests for several pre-reform 
years. 
In line with previous studies, we begin our analysis by examining unemployment spells. The 
duration of unemployment spells for young people is typically short. In our data one third of the spells 
terminate within one month. This, together with the administrative practices of how public 
employment offices register ending dates, results in numerous spells having exactly the same duration. 
Because of tied survival times, we grouped the data into discrete intervals by months of 
unemployment and use a proportional discrete time hazard model, see e.g. Allison (1984) and Jenkins 
(1995, 2005). To estimate how the YG affects exits from unemployment, we specify the instantaneous 
hazard for the jth month in unemployment as 
 
      ℎ௝൫ݔ௜௝൯ = 1 − expൣ− exp൫ߙ଴ + ߣ௔ + ߛ௧ + ߜ௝ܦ௜௝ + ݔ௜௝ᇱ ߚ + ߙ௝൯൧, (1) 
 
where ߙ௝ characterizes the baseline hazard, ߣ௔ and ߛ௧ are the main effects controlling for age and time 
effects, and ݔ௜௝  is a vector of individual covariates. ܦ௜௝ is an indicator that is assigned a value of one if a 
person is under the age of 25 and the youth guarantee is in place. Our primary interest is in the 
parameter ߜ௝ which measures the difference in changes in the hazard estimates between the treated 
and the controls after the implementation of the YG reform. We use equation (1) in a competing risk 
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framework with three exit routes, viz. unsubsidized employment, active measures and transitions out 
of the labour force, and model the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity as being normal.  
Analyses based on equation (1) provide only part of the story. To explore the unemployment entry 
effect, income effects and reasons for transitions out of the labour force, we broaden our view from 
unemployment spells to the population level. In our application, we estimate DiD regressions of the 
form  
  
                    ݕ௜௧ = ߙ + ߣ௔ + ߛ௧ + ∑ ߜ௞ܦ௜௧ି௞௠௞ୀି௟ + ݔ௜௧ᇱ ߚ + ߝ௜௧,  (2) 
 
where ߣ௔ and ߛ௧ are again the main effects controlling for age and time effects, respectively. xit includes 
individual-level characteristics, and ܦ௜௧ି௞ is an indicator variable equal to one if an individual i is 
under the age of 25 in year t-k.  Our primary interest is the parameters ߜ௞ which measure the relative 
change in outcome y between the treatment and the control groups. These parameters allow for l 
leads, which we exploit in testing for any pre-reform differences between the age groups, see Autor 
(2003). If our specification passes these pre-reform tests, we interpret the point estimates of m lagged 
treatment indicators as the intention-to-treat effects of the YG on outcome y.  
The treatment here consists of several ingredients, viz. intensified counselling and monitoring, 
threat effect, locking-in effects and actual effects of active measures. We interpret our intention-to-
treat results as a combination of all these potential effects among the affected age groups.We believe 
that this provides a relevant measure for assessing the reform effect among the affected age groups. 
Alternatively, to explore the longer term effects on the young people affected, one could follow two 
groups of individuals, of which one group was younger and the other group was older than 25 in the 
beginning of 2005. We have not done any such analysis here as the number of observations is 
considerably smaller and the estimates less precise, especially when exploring heterogeneous effects.  
 
4.2. Data  
Our data was collected from several official registers. The actual linking of different data sources 
was carried out by Statistics Finland using personal social security numbers. The resulting data set is a 
20% random sample of the whole population of young people born in 1967-1990. All these individuals 
are followed over the years 1987-2010 and in each of these years a 20% random sample of individuals 
who are new entrants to the population register and are born in 1967-1990 is added to our sample.  
The data is primarily created for examining youth labour markets. It includes the usual background 
information from the Population Register, such as year, month and place of birth, gender, number of 
children, marital status, place of residence, education etc. Detailed information on earnings and social 
benefits originate from the Tax Administration, the Social Insurance Institution of Finland and the 
National Institute for Health and Welfare. Information on all unemployment spells and all active 
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programme spells comes from the databases of the Social Insurance Institution of Finland and the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy. The starting and ending dates of all job contracts that 
individuals have had over the years come from the registers maintained by the Finnish Centre for 
Pensions. The data on unemployment spells is of very high quality as people’s benefits and pensions 
are based on this information. Information on parents and their biological maternity/paternity status 
is added to our data by linking the social security numbers of adults living in the same household as a 
child to the child’s social security number. We also know whether a young person has applied for 
further education, whether she has been accepted, and whether she is in an educational institution at 
present. This information comes from the registers maintained by the Ministry of Education. Finally, 
outcome variables measuring psychotropic drug purchases originate from the Drug Prescription 
Register maintained by the Social Insurance Institution. The data in this register covers all pharmacies 
and it is estimated to cover 97-98% of all reimbursed prescriptions3. Table A1 gives summary 
statistics of all the variables used in the estimations.  
To ensure the validity of the common trend assumption, our working sample consists of young 
people between the ages of 23 and 27. As discussed earlier, the guarantee sets up a maximum waiting 
period of six months before a young person under the age of 25 starts an activation measure. This 
creates some ambiguity in determining who is actually affected by the reform. We do not know 
whether an employment agency considers a person whose age at the beginning of an unemployment 
spell is e.g. 24 years and 10 months as belonging to the treatment group or not. In duration analysis we 
solve this problem by dropping all spells that started when a person was between 24.5 and 25 years of 
age. As the DiD regressions are based on yearly data, we drop all individuals who turned 25 during a 
calendar year. There are also differences in time periods. The duration analyses include all 
unemployment spells that started during the years 2003-2006, and in the DiD regressions the time 
period covers the years 2000-2007. We discuss the reasons for choosing the latter period in what 
follows. We also show that the results are not sensitive to selecting a shorter time period for analysis. 
 
4.3. Descriptive analysis 
Figure 3 plots the means of six outcome variables for one year before the reform (2004) and one 
year after the reform (2006). Panel A displays the share of young people registered as unemployed job 
seekers, and Panel B days spent in unsubsidized employment during a calendar year. In panel C, we 
plot the activation ratio that is created by dividing days spent in active measures by days spent in total 
unemployment (open unemployment + active measures). Panels D - F show, in respective order, the 
shares of young people who have applied for further education, have no taxable income or receive 
                                                            
3 Psychotropic drugs refer to five Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification subgroups: 
antidepressants (N06A, N06C), antipsychotics (N05A), anxiolytics (N05B), hypnotics and sedatives (N05C) and 
psychostimulants for ADHD (N06B). 
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social assistance. In each panel, the lines refer to averages by month of birth for individuals aged 19-
27. The vertical line shows the age limit of 25 years set in the youth guarantee. 
 
Figure 3. Selected outcome variables  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the limitations in assessing the impacts of the YG. Several outcome variables 
show a visible jump at the age of 21. Younger cohorts experience more unemployment, have fewer 
days in unsubsidized employment and less taxable income. This follows from two things. The typical 
age for completing both general and vocational secondary education is 19 and the majority of boys 
attend military service soon after graduation. This effectively rules out the inclusion of younger age 
groups in our analyses. In addition, there are evident differences in older age groups. The two outcome 
variables that remain roughly similar through the ages 22-27 are the share of individuals experiencing 
unemployment (20%) and the share of individuals with no taxable income (2%). All the other 
variables display clear upward or downward trends. Older individuals have more days in unsubsidized 
employment, and they are less likely to apply for further education or receive social assistance. These 
differences raise a question about the validity of our research setting where we use slightly older 
individuals as a control group for slightly younger individuals. The aspect of the data that is beneficial 
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for our purposes is that we have several pre- and post-periods. This allows us to formally test the 
assumption of similar trends between different age groups that is vital for identification. 
Figure 3 also gives us the first indications of the impact of the reform. The solid line representing the 
year of 2006 shows improvements in labour market outcomes when compared to the pre-reform year 
of 2004 marked by the dashed line. But these improvements have happened across the age 
distribution and there are no clear indications that changes differ on the two sides of the age limit of 
25. It is evident from these figures that the YG reform was not the only factor behind a reduction in 
youth unemployment that happened after 2005. 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Baseline results 
We begin our analyses by focusing on the impact of the YG reform on transitions during the first 12 
months of an unemployment spell4. The panels in Figure 4 show the predicted hazard for the treated 
as solid lines and for the controls as dashed lines. For both groups the period after the reform is 
separated from the pre-period by markers. The first thing to notice is that all transitions are more 
common during the post-reform period. The impact of the YG can be examined by comparing the 
relative change between the treated and the controls. Panel A shows that during the first three months 
a change in employment hazard is actually smaller among affected young persons. After an 
unemployment spell exceeds four months the lines start to separate, implying that the reform had a 
positive impact on transitions from unemployment to unsubsidized employment. The effect is 
estimated to be in the magnitude of 1-3 percentage points. As the number of unemployed young 
people who experience longer spells is small, the uncertainty increases at longer spells. Because of 
that, only one treatment dummy at the duration of 10 months turns out to be statistically significant 
and this is something one might expect to find even by accident at the conventional levels of 
significance.  
We find a little more convincing evidence on the impacts of the YG in Panel B, which plots hazards 
from unemployment to active measures. The lines of the treated and the controls separate after two 
months of unemployment, and the 1-1.5 percentage point differences found in the fourth and sixth 
month are both statistically highly significant. This coincides nicely with the time period during which 
activation guarantees written in personalized job search plans should materialize. There are also some 
fairly large parameter estimates after an unemployment spell exceeds 10 months, but owing to the 
small number of observations at longer durations, the point estimates fail to be statistically significant. 
                                                            
4 These evaluations are based on a proportional discrete time model in which the hazard rate is as in equation 
(1), all spells exceeding 12 months are treated as censored, and the unobserved heterogeneity follows a normal 
distribution. We also experimented with continuous time models and models with no unobserved heterogeneity. 
The results are very similar to those reported. 
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Panel B also reveals that, despite its name, the YG failed to be a real guarantee as the exit rates to 
active measures remain fairly modest.  
By far the most convincing evidence occurs when exploring exits out of the labour force. We find 
sizeable and statistically significant differences between the treatment and the control groups at 
durations between 2-4 months. The observed increase in the first months of unemployment is likely to 
arise from the more intensive job counselling and monitoring introduced as part of the youth 
guarantee. Whether this is a good or a bad sign depends on the exact destination of an exit. If there are 
no opportunities other than ending the unemployment spell, this could lead to a more severe problem 
of social exclusion. If, on the other hand, intensive job counselling results in additional education, there 
are clear benefits for society as a whole.  
 
Figure 4. Predicted hazard rates for different age groups before and after the 2005 youth guarantee 
 
Notes: (i) The predicted probabilities are based on equation 1 which includes the set of explanatory variables 
displayed in Table A1 and dummy indicators for the NUTS3 place of residence (20 regions); (ii) 
Statistically significant point estimates (at the 5% significance level) are marked using black squares; 
(iii) Before indicates that unemployment spells started during 2003-2004 and After indicates that 
unemployment spells started 2005-2006. 
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checking whether DiD regressions can reproduce the results reported in Figure 4. Here we base our 
statistical inference on clustered standard errors as there is likely to be correlation within groups and 
possibly across time. The combination of within-group and serial correlation is tricky, and according 
to Angrist and Pischke (2009) there is no consensus on how to best solve this problem. The simplest 
approach would be to cluster at the group level only but this cannot be done in our application. The 
small number of age cohort clusters would lead to badly biased standard errors. It is not, however, 
evident that our main concern should be correlation within age groups. A more likely scenario is that 
e.g. economic shocks are more commonly shared among young people living in the same region than 
among young people of the same age. For this reason, we cluster the standard error with respect to 
local labour markets. 
Table 1 reports the entry effect in the first column, and the baseline results in columns 2-4. These 
correspond to the DiD regression set up in equation (2). Our three variables that assess the pre-reform 
differences between the age groups are in rows DiD2002 – DiD2004. The reform effects for separate 
years are reported in rows DiD2005-DiD2007. The reform effect is summarized in the last row placed 
between the dashed lines (DiD 2005-07), which corresponds to the specification with only one 
treatment dummy covering all reform years. The upper panel A reports the pre- and post-reform 
effects when we include controls for year effects and age effects and the lower panel B reports the 
corresponding results after controlling for additional covariates, Xit.  
Table 1 shows no significant pre-treatment differences between the age groups. The one exception 
is found in the employment regression in Panel A but these differences are eliminated by the inclusion 
of background variables as shown in Panel B. The first column explores the existence of an 
unemployment entry effect. This is of considerable interest as previous studies on youth guarantees 
have primarily analysed unemployment spells, and their results might suffer from selection issues if 
the threat of intensive job counselling and mandatory activation discouraged affected young people 
from registering as unemployed job-seekers. There is, however, no evidence of an entry effect as our 
results indicate that the 2005 reform had no impact on the incidence of unemployment. At the 
population level the results show an increase of some five days in unsubsidized employment. All the 
parameter estimates in the unemployment regressions are estimated to be very close to zero and 
statistically insignificant. Finally, the results on the activation of unemployed young people are well in 
line with our previous analyses of hazards. Here our preferred specification shows that the YG 
increased the activation ratio by 1.5 percentage points.     
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Table 1: Baseline estimation results - population level  
PANEL A – WITHOUT COVARIATES
 COEFFICIENTS 
 Unemployment 
incidence 
Days  
unemployed
Days  
employed
Activation ratio 
among unemployed
DiD 2002 -0.002 1.00 -5.31*** 0.56 
 (0.004) (0.79) (1.77) (0.67) 
DiD 2003 -0.001 0.89 -4.96*** 0.51 
 (0.005) (1.08) (1.84) (0.64) 
DiD 2004 -0.000 0.79 -2.72* 0.20 
 (0.006) (1.09) (1.82) (0.65) 
DiD 2005 0.001 0.32 0.40 1.37** 
 (0.005) (1.14) (1.66) (0.69) 
DiD 2006 -0.004 0.01 2.44 2.00*** 
 (0.005) (1.08) (2.09) (0.63) 
DiD 2007 0.002 0.76 2.02 2.51*** 
 (0.006) (0.80) (2.56) (0.54) 
DiD 2005-07 -0.000 0.36 1.63 1.94*** 
 (0.005) (0.95) (1.88) (0.45) 
N 419,538 419,538 419,538 71,931 
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 
PANEL B – WITH COVARIATES
 COEFFICIENTS
 Unemployment 
incidence 
Days 
unemployed
Days 
employed
Activation ratio 
among unemployed
DiD 2002 -0.007* -0.32 -2.08 0.21 
 (0.004) (0.72) (1.75) (0.67) 
DiD 2003 -0.008* -0.86 -0.39 0.03 
 (0.004) (0.98) (1.77) (0.65) 
DiD 2004 -0.005 -0.56 2.59 -0.28 
 (0.005) (0.93) (1.65) (0.62) 
DiD 2005 -0.001 -0.49 4.71*** 0.89 
 (0.004) (0.95) (1.56) (0.76) 
DiD 2006 -0.005 -0.35 5.43*** 1.64*** 
 (0.005) (0.89) (1.44) (0.62) 
DiD 2007 -0.000 0.39 4.38** 1.94*** 
 (0.005) (0.63) (1.77) (0.53) 
DiD 2005-07 -0.002 -0.15 4.84*** 1.47*** 
 (0.004) (0.76) (1.35) (0.47) 
N 419,538 419,538 419,538 71,931 
Adj. R2 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.04 
 
Notes: (i) Unemployment refers to open unemployment and employment refers to unsubsidized employment; (ii) All 
estimations include the main effects for age groups and years. The estimations reported in Panel B also include the set 
of explanatory variables displayed in Table A1 and dummy indicators for place of residence measured at the NUTS3 
level (20 regions); (iii) The standard errors are clustered with respect to residential areas created by combining NUTS3 
place of residence, truncated NUTS2 unemployment rate and the degree of urbanization;; (iv) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
5.2. Heterogeneous results 
Next, we turn to additional results that extend our analyses in two ways. The first expansion is 
motivated by the explicit instruction given to employment offices to divide young people into different 
groups according to their educational level. To explore heterogeneous effects at different levels of 
education, we extract a sample of young people who were unemployed during the first half of a year 
and who have either compulsory or vocational education. To recall, under the YG a young person has 
to be offered an activation measure before the sixth month in unemployment. By focusing on young 
people who have been unemployed during the first six months of a year, we want to make sure that 
they can be actually affected by the YG during that year5. The skill division follows from the Finnish 
educational system. The mean age of graduating from a Finnish university is over 28 years of age, 
which means that the majority of young people who have completed upper secondary education are 
still studying at ages 23-27. Thus the composition of young people with a tertiary degree is likely to 
differ between the two age groups studied. Those who enter and graduate from tertiary education at 
early ages may have better labour market prospects than others due to e.g. motivation or ability.   
The second extension relates to various outcomes in young peoples’ lives that might also be affected 
by the youth guarantee. One aim of the reform was to encourage uneducated young persons to return 
to the ordinary educational system. We study this via two outcomes, viz. applying for education and 
actually being enrolled in an educational establishment. Potential income gains are explored via three 
outcomes: taxable income, the share of youngsters with no taxable income and the share of young 
people receiving social assistance. Since social assistance is non-taxable income provided as a last 
resort, this particular measure gives us a good indication of whether the YG reform affected 
youngsters who face the most severe difficulties in supporting themselves. Finally, we explore the 
impacts of the YG on the mental health of affected young persons by examining the use of 
antipsychotic drugs. Here we have two outcome measures. The first explores purchases of any 
psychotropic drugs within a year in one of the five ATC categories. The second registers only 
purchases of antipsychotic drugs (N05A) that are prescribed for more severe mental health 
conditions. The causal effect of activation measures on mental health is relatively unstudied in 
economics, but occupational psychologists have some experimental evidence that active measures, 
such as a job search programme, reduce levels of depressive symptoms, see e.g. Vinokour et al. (2000) 
and Vuori and Silvonen (2005). Provided that there is enough correlation between symptoms and 
psychotropic drug usage, these findings imply that an increase in activation measures might also show 
up as a reduction in the use of psychotropic drugs. At this point it is worth recalling that participation 
in an active labour market programme is only one part of the YG. Other parts of the YG, most notably 
                                                            
5 We estimated the same DiD regressions with the sample of young people who experienced unemployment 
during a year. The results are close to those reported and all of the conclusions remain the same.  
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early intervention and intensified monitoring, might also increase drug use if they result in the 
diagnosis of a previously hidden mental health problem that requires medication.  
Almost all the point estimates for the pre-reform period in Table 2 are small and statistically 
insignificant, implying that the target and the control group experience similar trends before the 
reform. The only difficulties arise when exploring the employment days and activation ratios of young 
people with no further education. In the case of employment days, it would be possible to equalize the 
pre-reform trend by dropping the youngest and the oldest age groups from the analysis and by 
comparing only 24-year-olds to 26-year-olds. Since the (unreported) post-reform effects remained 
insignificantly different from zero even in this case, we decided to report the results for the same age 
groups in both panels. We believe that this makes the analysis more transparent and helps 
comparisons between levels of education.  
Table 2 reveals that the post-reform effect masks substantial heterogeneity with respect to the level 
of education. Surprisingly, significant reform effects arise solely among unemployed young people who 
have graduated from a vocational secondary education institution. The parameter estimates reported 
in Panel A show no real improvements among unemployed young people with only compulsory 
education. If one focused solely on the first year of the YG reform, one could argue that the guarantee 
had a negative impact among unskilled young people. The results are qualitatively similar in later 
years, but they turn out to be statistically insignificant. This is also the case when testing the overall 
significance of post-reform estimates, which leads us to conclude that the youth guarantee had no 
impact on any outcome among uneducated and unemployed young people. 
The point estimates reported in panel B refer to unemployed young people with vocational 
education, and they show a statistically significant reduction in unemployment and an increase in both 
employment and activation ratios. On average, our findings show a fall of seven days in 
unemployment, a similar rise in employment days and an increase of over two percentage points in 
the activation ratio. The rise in the activation ratio corresponds to an increase of over five days in 
active measures. In relative terms, this increase is by far the greatest as the affected group spent 34 
days in activation measures before the reform. The corresponding figures for days in unemployment 
and employment were 149 days and 126 days, respectively.  
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Other impacts of the YG remain modest. There are some indications of reductions both in the need 
for social assistance and in purchases of psychotropic drugs. These findings coincide well with the 
results reporting improvements in employment prospects, but we do not want to push this 
interpretation too far for several reasons. First, the point estimates are relatively small, varying 
between 1-3 percentage points. Second, the point estimates are not very precise as four out of five 
marked point estimates reach only the 10% significance level. Third, the most convincing finding, 
according to which purchases of psychotropic drugs declined by 3 percentage points in 2007 (baseline 
being 11 percentage points), coincides with a change in the Pharmaceutical Reimbursement System 
introduced on 1 June 2006. One potentially problematic change introduced then was that cheap drugs 
costing less than 9 euros began to be registered in the prescription register. This resulted in an 
increase of almost 20% in registered psychotropic drug purchases. It is not totally evident why this 
increase should be relatively smaller among unemployed young people with vocational education and 
under 25 years of age. However, as there seems to be a similar, albeit less evident, evolution in 
purchases of psychotropic drugs among uneducated young persons in this age group, we are cautious 
in attributing all of the observed effect to the YG.  
Finally, there are some signs that the YG increased taxable income, but these estimates fail to be 
statistically significant. This finding might imply that improvements in employment happened in low-
wage jobs since the net increase in taxable income obtained by deducting lost unemployment benefits 
from gained wages is statistically zero. This conclusion has to be considered with caution since a net 
increase in earnings caused by seven more days in employment may not be big enough to be measured 
accurately.  
 
5.3. Interpretation 
One question that calls for closer attention is why the 2005 reform primarily affected more skilled 
unemployed young people with vocational education. It is especially illogical that the YG increased 
activation among this group as it is well documented that uneducated youngsters face more severe 
difficulties in labour markets and they are also more vulnerable to the discouragement effects of 
unemployment. Our explanation for the allocation of active measures between the two groups of 
young job seekers is provided in Figure 5. This shows the empirical hazard rates for exits from 
unemployment to active measures for the years 2000-2010 at different lengths of unemployment. 
Panel A reports the hazard rates for uneducated young people and panel B for those with a vocational 
education. The solid curves refer to the hazard of exit from unemployment to an active measure within 
the first 30 days in unemployment, the dashed line with a hollow triangle marker indicates the 
corresponding hazard of unemployment spells between 30 and 60 days provided that an 
unemployment spell has lasted at least 30 days, and so on. The 2005 YG reform is marked with a 
vertical line. 
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Figure 5. Empirical hazard rates from unemployment to active measures in different phases of young 
people’s unemployment spells, 2000-2010 
 
Notes: (i) The time intervals refer to days; (ii) The last two categories (90-150, 150-180) refer to the weighted 
average of two 30-day intervals. 
 
Figure 5 shows that before the 2005 reform uneducated persons had a higher risk of entering 
active measures than those with vocational education, regardless of the length of unemployment spell. 
The difference is especially striking at the beginning of unemployment. Within the first 30 days of 
unemployment some 10% of uneducated young people experienced a transition to active measures, 
compared to some 4% among those who had vocational education. During the next 30 days, the 
corresponding figures are 8% and 4%, respectively. This follows from the emphasis on early 
intervention adopted by the labour administration for uneducated young persons already in the late 
1990s. In this group early intervention is justified since the labour administration wants to keep 
unemployment experiences at the minimum in this low-skilled group and to help them gain further 
education via active measures. But Figure 5 indicates that early intervention with uneducated young 
people did not coincide well with the fixed time points of three and six months that were set in the 
2005 youth guarantee. As the labour administration tried to fulfil the promise of an activation 
guarantee, it increased activation among those unemployed youngsters who were less intensively 
activated in the early stages of their unemployment spells i.e. those with a vocational education.  
Do our findings tell us something about the effectiveness of active labour market programmes 
among educated young unemployed people? Probably, since we only observe positive effects in this 
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group, whose members were more likely to participate in active programmes owing to the YG reform. 
Before pushing this interpretation too far, it has to be noted that the YG also introduced a number of 
other changes, and our data does not allow us to separate e.g. the counselling/monitoring effect from 
the participation effect. A proper evaluation of the importance of active programmes requires them to 
be assessed separately from other changes. In our case, the actual increase in the activation rate is not 
likely to be large enough to create a reliable quasi-experimental research setting. For these reasons, 
we interpret our findings as a combination of different effects and do not try to assess their relative 
importance in our context.  
 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The difference-in-difference estimates in previous sections eliminate the age and time effects 
assuming that the outcome variables evolve similarly in the treated and control groups. We have 
already tested this assumption by including pre-reform DiD variables in our estimations. Our data 
enables us to do even more than that. Since our data starts from the year 1987 it is possible to repeat 
the above analysis for the years before the introduction of the guarantee. We carry out a number of 
these regressions by moving the eight-year estimation window forwards from the year 1994 and 
leaving the last three years for the placebo treatment. The results of the placebo tests are reported in 
Figure 6, in which the horizontal axis shows the years of the placebo treatments, the dots show the 
point estimates and the vertical lines indicate their confidence intervals. We focus on three outcome 
variables for which we found significant reform effects above, so the results are comparable to Panel B 
of Table 2, with one exception. The first year for which we have parental data is 1987, so the oldest 
birth cohort for whom we get parental information is only 21 years of age in 1994. Hence we had to 
drop parental information from our placebo regressions.  
Figure 6 shows that in Panels A and B all the pre-reform placebo effects turn out to be statistically 
insignificant, and in a majority of cases also oppositely signed to those reported in Table 2. Hence 
there seems to be no element in our empirical specification that systematically produces the reported 
YG effects on unemployment and employment6. One further point regarding the placebo effects is that 
it is not surprising that they disappear when entering the last placebo period of 2007-09. After 2007, 
the control group consists entirely of young people who were in the treatment group during the first 
year of the YG. The only way that there could be significant effects in the placebo years 2007-09 would 
be if the YG becomes more effective over time. There is no evidence for that.   
 
 
                                                            
6 We also estimated the DiD regressions without covariates. These (unreported) results show that the estimates 
reported in Figure 6 are not sensitive to controlling for background characteristics. This particular finding 
indicates that the common trend problem reported for the employment regression at the population level in 
Table 1 was caused by differences in the education levels between the age groups. 
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Figure 6. The results of placebo tests on young unemployed people with vocational education 
 
Notes: (i) Panels A and B refer to days and panel C to percentage points; (ii) The dots display the coefficients 
of dummy variables that are set to unity for the age group of 23-24 during the period of three years shown on the 
horizontal axis; (iii) The vertical lines show the 95% confidence intervals based on clustered standard errors. 
 
If panels A and B pass all the placebo tests, panel C shows statistically very significant differences 
between the treatment and the control group before the actual YG reform. All the pre-reform estimates 
are found to be negative, which tells us that activation of the slightly older control group was 
intensified during these years relative to the treatment group of slightly younger individuals. Starting 
from the period 2003-05, when the first actual reform year starts to affect the treatment dummy, the 
parameter estimates jump from negative to positive, which implies a change in the composition of 
activation. The highly significant pre-reform effects, however, cast serious doubt on the robustness of 
the actual reform effect on the activation ratio, which was reported to be over two percentage points 
in Table 2. To gain a better understanding of this we plot the activation ratios for the two groups of 
unemployed young persons with vocational education in 1994-2010.  
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Figure 7. Activation ratios for unemployed young persons with vocational education, 1996-2010 
 
 
Figure 7 reveals that the negative pre-reform placebo estimates result from a sharp increase in 
activation among the control group during the years 1998 and 1999. This coincides with the reform of 
Finnish labour market policy that was introduced in the beginning of 1998 and gradually implemented 
during the next two years. The main changes in the 1998 reform were the introduction of job search 
plans, regular meetings with the labour authorities and job search training. The activation ratio was 
especially affected by job search training consisting of a short course lasting a week during which 
individuals were taught how to seek vacancies, update their CV’s, write job applications etc. Our 
placebo results pick up the effects of this reform as job search training was targeted more intensively 
for slightly older persons.   
There is one more thing to be worried about. The period 1999-2001, when the difference between 
the activation ratios of the treated and the controls was non-existent, coincides with the first two years 
in our DiD regressions. This would bias our preferred results if job search training affected the labour 
market prospects of the participants. If job search training has any effects, the most likely scenario 
would be that participation in a job search training course improves the participant’s possibilities to 
get a job. In this particular case our results for the unemployment and employment effects would be 
biased downwards as participation in job search training was more common among the control group 
during the reference years. There is, however, fairly convincing evidence based on two randomized 
experiments according to which job search training has no impact on the further employment 
prospects of participants, see Hämäläinen et al. (2008). This would imply that our results concerning 
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the unemployment and employment effects of the YG are unaffected by the 1998 reform, but the 
activation results are likely to be upward-biased. To gain some insight into this, we re-estimated our 
DiD regressions using the estimation period 2002-2007. As there are only three pre-reform time 
periods before the 2005 YG reform, we did not include any pre-reform effects in these estimations. Our 
(unreported) point estimates are -6.88**, 7.19* and 1.38** for unemployment, employment and the 
activation ratio, respectively. To get a fair comparison point for these estimates we re-estimated the 
previously reported models by excluding all pre-reform variables. This resulted in parameter 
estimates of -6.89**, 7.09** and 1.74***.   
These results confirm that by maximizing the estimation period and exploring potential pre-reform 
differences we did not cause any bias in our employment and unemployment estimates, but slightly 
overestimated the impact that the youth guarantee had on the activation of unemployed young 
persons with vocational education. However, the activation effect still remains both statistically 
significant and positive. One additional piece of information is that in these re-estimations we again 
failed to find any increase in the activation ratios of low-skilled unemployed young persons with no 
further education.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides new insight into the effects of activation guarantees offered to young people by 
the public sector. Our contribution is twofold. First, we provide new evidence from Finland by 
analysing the 2005 youth guarantee which applied to young persons under the age of 25. Second, we 
broaden the analyses carried out in previous studies by examining the unemployment entry effect, 
educational effect, income effect and psychotropic medication usage effect of the YG. Our baseline 
results resemble previous studies. We find only limited impact on transitions from unemployment to 
employment and show that the 2005 reform was far from a subjective activation guarantee. 
Disturbingly, there is also some evidence of out-of-labour force transitions among the young persons 
concerned.  
Further examinations give support to previous studies that have mainly focused on transitions out 
of unemployment as we do not find any evidence of the young persons concerned opting out of 
registering as unemployed job seekers after monitoring and activation is intensified. The most 
surprising of our findings is that the 2005 youth guarantee only affected unemployed young people 
with vocational education. We find no increase in activation, or any change in other outcomes, among 
the most vulnerable group of youngsters consisting of unemployed and uneducated young people. In 
contrast, among unemployed young persons with vocational education the activation ratio was 
increased by 2 percentage points, days in open unemployment reduced by 7 days and days in non-
subsidized employment increased by 7 days. There are also some, albeit less convincing, implications 
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that the YG reduced both the need for social assistance and purchases of psychotropic drugs among 
educated young persons. We attribute the heterogeneous effects to the activation rules that prevailed 
before the 2005 reform. Early intervention was already in place among uneducated job seekers, so the 
new activation periods only affected educated job seekers.   
All in all, the 2005 youth guarantee strengthened the activation of young people under the age of 25 
but it did not offer any subjective rights for activation measures. This has also been the case in other 
countries as well as with the renewed version of the YG that was introduced in Finland in 2013. It is far 
from evident that the labour authority should offer an activation measure for every unemployed young 
person in the first place. But it is probable that more countries will intensify their activation of their 
youth populations following the guidelines of the EU Commission. Our results indicate that this would 
not necessarily lead to more intensified activation among young people who have the most severe 
difficulties in entering the labour market. One thing to bear in mind when introducing a youth 
guarantee scheme with prescheduled activation time points is to think about how it interacts with 
existing rules and practices for allocating activation measures to different groups of young people.  
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
 POPULATION UNEMPLOYED 
        2003-2004 2005-2006  2003-2004 2005-2006 
 23-24 26-27 23-24 26-27 23-24 26-27 23-24 26-27
DEPENDENT VARIABLES         
Unemployment incidence 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 1 1 1 1 
Days in open unemployment 27 31 23 27 141 160 128 152 
Days in unsubsidized 
employment 200 238 208 241 120 121 122 124 
Activation ratio 3.97 3.41 4.37 3.71 12.99 10.72 14.92 11.31 
Applied for education 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.10 0.36 0.17 0.36 0.16 
Studying 0.49 0.28 0.50 0.31 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.15 
Taxable income 12 715 18 453 13 599 19 185 10 424 12 372 10 684 12 846 
No taxable income 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 
Social assistance recipient 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.12 
Psychotropic medication 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 
Antipsychotic medication 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS   
Basic education 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.25 
A-level 0.37 0.17 0.36 0.18 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 
Secondary education 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.52 0.43 0.53 0.43 
Bachelor 0.09 0.25 0.08 0.22 0.12 0.22 0.09 0.18 
Master 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.07 
Male 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.52 
Child less than 7  0.13 0.25 0.13 0.24 0.15 0.27 0.15 0.25 
Married  0.09 0.22 0.09 0.21 0.10 0.19 0.09 0.19 
Regional unemployment rate 11.36 11.17 9.84 9.63 12.28 12.09 10.80 10.54 
IMMIGRANT FROM    
Russia/Estonia 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.016 
EU 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.005 
OECD 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Yugoslavia/Iran/Iraq/Somalia 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.013 
Other country 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.014 0.010 0.014 0.012 0.019 
PARENTAL INFORMATION AT THE AGE OF 14   
Mother biological 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.88 
Mother employed 0.71 0.78 0.72 0.71 0.63 0.70 0.62 0.62 
Mother's income 14 732 14 236 15 715 14 197 12 583 12 357 13 133 12 412 
Mother has secondary 
education 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.41 0.37 0.41 0.38 
Mother has tertiary education 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.26 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.18 
Mother missing 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Father biological 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.69 0.71 0.67 0.69 
Father employed 0.67 0.73 0.68 0.67 0.58 0.65 0.57 0.58 
Father's income 19 854 20 325 21 333 19 260 15 336 16 616 16 342 15 676 
Father has secondary education 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.30 
Father has tertiary education 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.17 
Father missing 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.17 
 
